Imagination consists of the usage of words that are devoid of an actual object.

Bryant Commentary:

The commentators take the third type of vṛtti, imagination, to be metaphor, words or expressions that do not correspond to any actual physical reality, vastu-śunya, but are understood in common parlance, śabda-jñāna-anupatī. When we say “consciousness is the essence of puruṣa” (caitanyaṁ puruṣasya svarūpam iti), says Vyāsa, we are, strictly speaking, making an incorrect statement. Using the genitive case, as in the “essence of puruṣa,” implies a distinction between the possessor and the thing possessed, as in the phrase “the cow of Citra.” But consciousness is not a separate entity owned by another separate entity puruṣa as this phrase suggests. Consciousness is puruṣa, not something owned by puruṣa. Likewise with negative predictions such as “the puruṣa has the characteristic of not being born”: there is not a factual positive state of “not being born”; something that does not exist has no sensible existence, yet such phrases do bear meaning. Using language in this way is vikalpa. 

“Vyāsa gives other examples of this nature,76 but if we, along with the commentators, can extend the technical denotative range of vikalpa somewhat, perhaps a more straightforward example from English usage might be “the sun rises and sets” or “time flies.” The sun doesn’t actually either rise or set, nor is there a tangible entity called time flapping about with wings, but common usage has assigned meaning to these imaginary states of affairs, and no one bats an eye when such expressions are uttered. In other words, metaphors and similes might be considered types of vikalpas. Indeed, Vācaspati Miśra notes that these expressions, which, if dissected to their literal meanings, do not correspond to actual objective reality, are normal everyday expressions and ubiquitous in human language, since language is largely figurative.

Vyāsa gives other examples of this nature, but if we, along with the commentators, can extend the technical denotative range of vikalpa somewhat, perhaps a more straightforward example from English usage might be “the sun rises and sets” or “time flies.” The sun doesn’t actually either rise or set, nor is there a tangible entity called time flapping about with wings, but common usage has assigned meaning to these imaginary states of affairs, and no one bats an eye when such expressions are uttered. In other words, metaphors and similes might be considered types of vikalpas. Indeed, Vācaspati Miśra notes that these expressions, which, if dissected to their literal meanings, do not correspond to actual objective reality, are normal everyday expressions and ubiquitous in human language, since language is largely figurative.

In this way, although other schools, such as Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, consider vikalpa to be a category of error rather than a vṛtti in its own right, the Yoga school considers the vṛtti of vikalpa, imagination, to differ essentially from the previous two vṛttis. This is because the first vṛtti, right knowledge, corresponds to accurate knowledge of an actual objective reality, recognized as such by others, and error corresponds to a misperception or misunderstanding of something, and therefore it is perceived as an error by other people who can see the actual nature of the misunderstood object. Vikalpa, on the other hand, while, like error, referring to an object that lacks actual objective physical reality, yet, unlike the vṛtti of error but like the vṛtti of right knowledge, is not based on an error of judgment and is intelligible to other people in practice, producing a vṛtti impression in the mind of the listener without being perceived as an error or attracting any attention. It thus paradoxically represents a meaningful expression that yet has no actual reality in the real world. It is therefore held to be a different category of vṛtti from pramāṇa or viparyaya.

We thus see what a meticulous thinker Patañjali is. Let us keep our eye on the ball: In order to understand what puruṣa is, one has to understand what it is not (I.4). It is not the mind. Therefore, Patañjali is directing very careful attention to what the mind is such that the yogī can be clear about what the puruṣa should not be identified with. The mind can be recognized by what it does. Patañjali is thus identifying the things that the mind does, that is, its functions. Since vikalpa, conceptual thought, does not fit into the other types of vṛttis such as pramāṇa and viparyaya even as it shares features of both of these, he has concluded that it must belong to a category of its own.

Vijñānabhikṣu accepts the more common understanding of this vṛtti of vikalpa—the usage of nonsensical expressions such as skyflower, hare’s horn, or son of a barren woman, which are the typical motifs in Hindu philosophical discourse that correspond to expressions in English such as pie in the sky. These are all nonexistent objects, but they nonetheless produce some sort of an intelligible vṛtti in the mind of the listener. It is curious that the commentators do not direct specific attention to more common aspects of imaginative thought, such as daydreaming, fantasy, make believe, and wishful thinking, which actually occupy major portions of most people’s waking attention. Such things might also be considered types of vikalpas but, since they depend on the activation of saṁskāras, which are imprints of real things, they overlap with other vṛttis, particularly the function of memory, the fifth type of vṛtti discussed below, and/or error, since they have no reality.

The Modification Called ‘Vikalpa’ Is Bases On Verbal Cognition In Regard To A Thing Which Does Not Exists. (It is a Kind Of Useful Knowledge Arising Out Of A Meaning Of A Work But Having No Corresponding Reality).

Conceptualization derives from linguistic knowledge, not contact with real things.

“Imagination is a fluctuating knowledge created by relying upon the sound of language alone, and words that are empty of objective truth.

An image conjured up by words without any substance behind it is fancy.

Taimini Commentary:

The first two categories of mental modifications exhaust all kinds of experiences in which there is some kind of contact with an object outside the mind. These may therefore be called ‘objective’ in their nature. Now we come to the other two kinds of Vrttis in which there is no such contact and the mental image is a pure creation of the mind. Here again we have two subdivisions. If the mental modification is based upon a previous experience and merely reproduces it we have a case of memory. If it is not based upon an actual experience in the past or has nothing to correspond to in the field of actual experience but is a pure creation of the mind then it is fancy or imagination. When we mentally review the events of our past life such mental modifications belong to the realm of memory. When we read a novel our Vrttis belong to the realm of fancy. Of course, even in the case of fancy the mental images will be found on analysis to be derived ultimately from the sensuous perceptions which we have actually experienced sometime or other, but the combinations are novel and these do not correspond to any actual experience. We may imagine a horse with the head of a man. Here the head of a man and the body of a horse have been perceived separately and belong to the realm of memory but the combination of the two in one composite image which does not correspond to an actual experience makes the mental image a case of Vikalpa. The two categories of memory and fancy on account of the absence of any contact with an external object which stimulates the mental image may be called ‘subjective’ in their nature.

Verbal knowledge devoid of substance is fancy or imagination.

Iyengar Commentary:

Playing with fanciful thoughts or words, and living in one’s own world of thoughts and impressions which have no substantial basis, is vikalpa, a vague and uncertain knowledge which does not correspond to reality. In such a state of delusion, one is like the hare in the fable who imagined it had horns.

If vikalpa is brought to the level of factual knowledge by analysis, trial, error, and discrimination, it can awaken a thirst for correct or true knowledge, and delusion can be transformed into vision and discovery. Unless and until such a transformation takes place, knowledge based on imagination remains without substance.

An image that arises on hearing mere words without any reality [as its basis] is verbal delusion.

Satchidananda Commentary:

 You hear something, but really there is nothing like that. In viparyayaḥ (misconception), at least there is a rope to be mistaken for a snake. But in vikalpaḥ (verbal delusion), there is nothing there. Yet you still create some opinion about it. Suppose I say, “John took his car to the garage and on the way all the tires got punctured, so he had to remove the wheels and give them to the mechanic to be repaired. He drove home very fast and got into an accident.” You say, “Oh, was it a terrible accident?” You are only hearing my words. You haven’t taken the time to think. If you thought about it, you would say, “If he gave all four wheels to be repaired, he couldn’t drive it back.” It didn’t happen, but you take it seriously. Another example would be, “His mother was a barren woman.” It’s verbal delusion, but it may still create an impression in your mind.

Verbal delusion follows from words having no (corresponding) reality.

SV Commentary:

There is another class of Vrttis called Vikalpa. A word is uttered, and we do not wait to consider its meaning; we jump to a conclusion immediately. It is the sign of weakness of the Chitta. Now you can understand the theory of restraint. The weaker the man the less he has of restraint. Consider yourselves always in that way. When you are going to be angry or miserable, reason it out, how it is that some news that has come to you is throwing your mind into Vrttis.

Imagination is followed in sequence by verbal knowledge and expression, and is devoid of objective substratum. This does not reach up to real cognition. Nor does it reach up to unreal cognition. Even in the absence of an objective substratum, its action is found to be dependent upon the power of verbal expression and knowledge.

As for example : — ‘ Purusa is of the nature of consciousness.’ Now what is here predicated of what ? seeing that Purusa is consciousness itself, and that there must always be a statement of the relationship of one to another in predication ; as in the phrase Chitra’s cow.

Similarly, ‘‘the purusa is inactive and the characteristics of an object are denied to it.

“Bana stands, will stand, has stood.” The meaning of the root alone is understood by (the act of) the cessation of motion.

Similarly in the sentence, “The purusa has the characteristics of not being born,” the mere absence of the characteristic of not being born is to be understood, and not any positive characteristic possessed by the purusa. That characteristic has therefore, been imagined and has come into practical usage.

~ Rāma Prasāda translation.

Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa
or the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa
by Śaṅkara

Patañjali Sūtra I.9

Logical construction is something that follows on verbal knowledge but has no real object

This (vikalpa) does not amount to right knowledge.

Now he describes logical construction. Verbal knowledge means knowledge from words, and something that follows on verbal knowledge means something whose nature is to follow from the verbal knowledge, good or bad, which comes from the fixed relation between words and their meanings; but has no real object means that nothing is actually expressed, inasmuch as there is no actual (yathābhūta) thing as the meaning of those words from which that knowledge follows. Logical construction is thinking without reference to any actual thing.

(Opponent) If it follows on verbal knowledge, it should be taken as authority.

(Answer) It does not amount to right knowledge. It does not fall under authority because it has no real object. Authority does arise from verbal knowledge, but it relates to actual things. So authority has a real object, indicated by the words, whereas logical construction, having no real object, is not right knowledge. Moreover, logical construction is the same in the speaker and the hearer; in both of them the idea of the logical construction has arisen from words. Not so authority, which is such for the hearer alone; for the speaker it is what he has seen or inferred. Again, for one in the samādhi without verbal associations (nirvitarka), logical construction ceases, but not authority. Therefore it does not amount to a right knowledge. Nor does it amount to illusion. Though its object is non-existent, it is by the prestige of verbal knowledge that worldly life is upheld wholly. As for example when it is said ‘consciousness is the nature of Puruṣa’, since Puruṣa is consciousness alone, what is being described here, and by what? Yet an idea does arise by way of description, as in the case of the words ‘Caitra’s cow’.

(Opponent) Since its object does not exist, it should be included under illusion.

(Answer) Nor does it amount to illusion. Why not? Because it follows on verbal knowledge. Illusion – though its object too is non-existent – has no reference to verbal knowledge; it has been defined as false knowledge based on an untrue form. But logical construction is an extension of ideas determined by a right knowledge. Illusion is in the end removed, because it contradicts everything else; not so, logical construction, because that conforms to ideas from a right knowledge.

So the expressions whose object is non-existent and following on verbal knowledge, taken together, point to a separate mental process, logical construction, which is distinct both from right knowledge and from illusion, though it has a trace of each of them about it. Inasmuch as there is this trace of them about it, logical construction is introduced immediately after them instead of memory, because memory is based simply upon something experienced formerly.

(Opponent) No such mental process can be established, because it has no real form.

(Answer) Though its object is non-existent, it is by the prestige of verbal knowledge that worldly life is upheld wholly. The word wholly is intended to make it clear that there is no other cause apart from verbal knowledge. To the demand for an example he says, consciousness is the nature of Puruṣa. As the power-of-consciousness has been defined as unchanging, Puruṣa is simply consciousness. That being the thing itself, there is no difference between them, and the words ‘the consciousness of Puruṣa’ do not amount to a description, which always presupposes some difference somewhere.

To make this point, the grammarian says in his work Vārttika, ‘A thing is established by bringing out a secondary element (in the description).’ In the present case, ‘Caitra’s cow’ assumes a difference, and ‘Puruṣa’s consciousness’ is just like it in form; but Puruṣa is not something different from consciousness, so the words cannot be descriptive, whereas Caitra’s difference from his cow is the basis of a description. Nor is consciousness anything different from Puruṣa, which could make for a description. And yet, the idea does appear that ‘consciousness is the nature of Puruṣa’ is somehow a description, implying relation between different things.

‘Puruṣa is actionless’ is a denial that it has the property of a thing. Similarly, when it is said ‘the arrow stops’ or the arrow has stopped’, we understand cessation of movement and the thing as itself alone. So ‘Puruṣa does not come to have properties’ means simply the absence of properties coming to be for him, not that Puruṣa does have a property – of not coming to be. Thus the properties, by which the life of the world goes on, are imagined logical constructs.

Vastu-dharma means the property (dharma) of a thing or fact (vastu); pratiśiddha-vastu-dharmā means that the fact of having a property is denied of him. As Pāṇini says (sūtra 5.4.124) dharmādanic kevalāt- the word dharma becomes dharman and hence dharmā by the change called samāsānta at the end of a compound which is to be taken as a whole.

The word thing indicates the guṇa-s like sattva, and their properties are denied of Puruṣa.

It is not that the very denial would mean that the properties of sattva and the others must be possible in Puruṣa. The meaning is simply this: they do not exist in any Puruṣa so that they could be described as ‘his’. But even so, just as there is an idea of description in the words ‘the spotted cows are his’, so there is an idea of description in the words ‘the properties are denied of him’.

Again, to say ‘action has gone from him’ implies a previous connection with action, as when we say ‘action has gone from Caitra’ (an idiom for ‘Caitra is taking a rest’). Action is impossible in Puruṣa, so it is impossible for action to go from Puruṣa. Still, the sentence ‘Puruṣa is without action’ does give an idea of description.

Puruṣa does not come to have properties means that the coming-intoexistence of properties is not found in him, as has been said. The commentator explains: it means simply the absence of properties coming to be for him. For instance, he is without guṇa-s, pure, without parts. Giving the various examples in regard to the self (ātman) is to define by exclusion what the self really is.

The arrow stops, the arrow will stop, the arrow has stopped. A wellknown example from life is given to resolve any remaining doubt. Stops is cessation of movement, absence of movement. There is no conjunction of an absence with any of the three periods of time, nor of an arrow as a substance regardless of function, nor any connection of the cessation of movement, which is an absence, with an arrow which is a thing. Thus the three examples are given: the arrow stops, will stop, has stopped.

(Opponent) The bare meaning of the root ‘stop’ is cessation of motion. What subject can there be for a predicate like cessation of motion?

(Answer) This is why other examples are given. Unless they are distinct, neither subject nor predicate can exist. There is a verbal root having the sense of cessation of motion, and an idea of description is aroused by the designative power of the words, implying a relation between an existent subject and existent predicate. This is how the object of a logical construction is produced, as demonstrated in the various examples.