Right knowledge consists of sense perception, logic, and verbal testimony.

Bryant Commentary:

The first of the five vṛttis to be discussed is pramāṇa, the central concern of epistemology, that is, what sources constitute valid knowledge of an object, the methods of attaining accurate information about reality. Philosophy and, of course, science—Sāṅkhya, after all, sees itself as dealing with physical verifiable truths—have as their goals the attainment of knowledge about reality, so it is standard in Indic philosophical discourse for scholastics to state which methods of attaining such knowledge of reality they accept as valid. The Yoga school accepts three sources of receiving knowledge, as does the Sāṅkhya tradition (Sāṅkhya Kārikā IV), but other philosophical schools accept differing numbers from one to six.

The first method of attaining valid knowledge listed by Patañjali is sense perception: We can know something to be true or valid if we experience it through one or more of our senses—if we see, smell, touch, hear, or taste it. So, for example, you “know” this book is real because you see it and feel it. Śaṅkara notes that sense perception, empiricism, is placed first on the list of pramāṇas because the other pramāṇas are dependent on it.

Vyāsa defines sense perception as the state or condition of the mind, vṛtti, that apprehends both the specific (viśeṣa) and generic (sāmānya) nature of an external object through the channels of the five senses. The generic and specific nature of objects are categories especially associated with the Vaiśeṣika school of Hindu philosophy and are technical ways of attempting to analyze physical reality. The generic nature of a dog that one might happen to come upon, for example, is that it belongs to the canine species, the specific nature is that which demarcates it from other members of this generic category, that it is, let us say, a ginger Irish terrier. (Technically speaking, viśeṣa is what differentiates ultimate irreducible entities such as the smallest subatomic particles of matter from each other, but Vyāsa is using the term in a more general sense, since dogs, as all material objects, are made up of conglomerates of atoms. When one sees a particular dog, the mind typically apprehends both its generic and specific natures. This is accomplished by the citta encountering a sense object through the senses and forming an impression of this object, a vṛtti. More specifically, the tāmasic natures of sense objects imprint themselves upon the mind and are then illuminated in the mind by the mind’s sāttvic nature. Due to pervading the mind, the puruṣa’s awareness then becomes conscious of this mental impression, as if it were taking place within itself, indistinguishable from itself. In actual fact, the impression is imprinted on the citta, mind, which is pervaded by consciousness.

Vācaspati Miśra raises a question here. If the impression is imprinted on the mind, which, according to the metaphysics of Yoga, is a totally separate entity from the puruṣa soul, then how is it that the latter is aware of it? Or, as he puts it, if an axe cuts a khadira tree, it is not a plakṣa tree that is thereby cut. In other words, if an impression is something that is made on the mind, then how does it end up being made on the puruṣa? Here, again, Vācaspati Miśra introduces the analogy of the mirror. It is the mind and intelligence, not the soul, that take the form of the object as a result of sense perception. According to the reflection model of awareness, consciousness is reflected in the intelligence due to their proximity and then is misidentified with the reflection by the mind.

This reflection, in turn, is altered according to the form assumed by the intelligence—just as a reflection appears dirty if the mirror is dirty. Thus, since the mind and intelligence have taken the form of the object in question, consciousness sees its own reflection as containing that form. This corresponds to the analogy of the moon appearing rippled when reflected in rippling water. According to the nonreflection model, awareness simply pervades the citta just as it pervades the body and is misidentified as being nondifferent from the forms of citta in the same way as it is misidentified with the form of the body. According to either manner of conceptualization, this misidentification of the awareness of puruṣa with the forms of the intellect is the essence of ignorance.

Moving on to the second pramāṇa, source of receiving valid knowledge, mentioned by Patañjali in this sūtra, Vyãsa defines anumāna, inference, as the assumption that an object of a particular category shares the same qualities as other objects in the same category, qualities that are not shared by objects in different categories. He gives the rather clumsy example of the moon and stars, which belong to the category of moving objects because they are seen to move, but mountains belong to a category of immobile objects, because they have never been seen to move. Thus, if one sees an unfamiliar mountain or hill, one can infer that it will not move, because other known objects in this category, all mountains and hills with which one is familiar, do not move.

The more classical example of inference among Hindu logicians is that fire can be inferred from the presence of smoke. Since wherever there is smoke, there is invariably fire causing it, the presence of fire can be inferred upon the perception of smoke even if the actual fire itself is not perceived. So if one sees clouds of smoke billowing forth from a distant mountain, one can say with certainty that there must be fire on it, even if one cannot actually see the blaze itself. It is in this regard that inference, anumāna, differs from the first source of knowledge, pratyakṣa, sense perception. Pratyakṣa requires that one actually see the fire. In anumāna, the fire itself is not actually seen, but its presence is inferred from something else that is perceived, smoke. The principle here is that there must always be an absolute and invariable relationship (vyāpti, concomitance) between the thing inferred, say, the fire, and the reason on which the inference is made, the presence of smoke—in other words, wherever there is or has ever been smoke there must at all places and at all times always be or have been fire present as its cause with no exceptions. If these conditions are met, the inference is accepted as a valid source of knowledge. If exceptions to the rule can be found, even one instance of smoke ever that does or did not have fire as its cause, then the inference is invalid.

Finally, āgama, verbal testimony, the third source of valid knowledge accepted by Patañjali, is the relaying of accurate information through the medium of words by a trustworthy person who has perceived or inferred the existence of an object, to someone who has not. Vyāsa describes a trustworthy person as someone whose statements cannot be contradicted. Vācaspati Miśra adds that such a person should have keen sense organs and be trustworthy and compassionate, and Vijñānabhikṣu, that a reliable or trustworthy person is one who is free from defects such as illusion, laziness, deceit, dull-wittedness, and so forth. The words of such a reliable authority enter the ear and produce an image, vṛtti, in the mind of the hearer that corresponds to the vṛtti experienced by the trustworthy person. The person receiving the information in this manner has neither personally experienced nor inferred the existence of the object of knowledge, but valid knowledge of the object is nonetheless achieved, which distinguishes this source of knowledge from the two discussed previously.

The most important category of valid knowledge in the form of āgama, verbal testimony, is divine scripture, which is also referred to as śruti, that which is heard, or śabda, the word. Since scriptures are considered to have been uttered by trustworthy persons in the form of enlightened sages and divine beings, their status as trustworthy sources of knowledge is especially valuable. In order to elaborate on this, Vācaspati Miśra raises the issue of how sacred scriptures can be considered valid given that all accurate verbal knowledge must itself originally come either from perception or inference (hence the Cārvāka and Vaiśeṣika schools do not even consider them separate sources of knowledge), but scriptures deal with certain subjects that no human being has either seen or inferred (such as the existence of heavenly realms). Vācaspati Miśra responds that the truths of scripture have been perceived by God, Īśvara; thus divine scripture, too, is based on perception—and God, quips Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, is surely a trustworthy person! However, Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary to the Saṅkhya Kārikā (V), precludes the blind acceptance of scripture by qualifying that revelation may be a useful means of attaining knowledge only if it has a solid foundation, contains no internal contradictions, is supported by reason, and is accepted by people in general.

Vyāsa makes a telling comment in I.32 relevant to the hierarchy of Yoga epistemology. Perception is superior to any other sources of knowledge—indeed, the other sources of knowledge are based on it. If we consider the syllogism there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, even though the fire is not seen by direct perception and therefore an inference is required to establish its existence, this inference is dependent on perception insofar as the sign (liṅga) of the fire, namely, smoke, is perceived. So valid inferences are also dependent on perception. And, as indicated, verbal authority is predicated on the original perception of the object of information by the relayer of the information. Additionally, it can be argued that accepting knowledge from a verbal authority is nothing other than making an inference—one makes an inference that a verbal authority is reliable and does not counter perceivable data. Verbal authority too, then, is indirectly derived from direct perception. Therefore some schools of thought, like that associated with the materialist Cārvāka, accept the need for only one pramāṇa, that of sense perception. The Yoga school accepts three sources but is very clear that it considers pratyakṣa the highest, not just because the other pramāṇas depend on it, but (as will become clearer in I.49) because it is the only way of truly knowing the essential nature of an object.

Different schools of thought prioritized different pramāṇas. The Nyāya school features anumāna, dedicating itself for centuries to refining categories of logic, and Sāṅkhya, too, was associated with this epistemology.70 The Vedānta school occupied itself with āgama (Vedānta Sūtras I.1.3), dedicating itself to the interpretation and systematization of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta Sūtras derived from them; the Mīmāṁsā school, too, prioritized āgama and became especially associated with developing hermeneutics, the methods of scriptural interpretation.71 While Patañjali accepts āgama as a valid source of knowledge, he does not quote or even indirectly refer to a single verse from scripture in his treatise (in contrast with the Vedānta Sūtras, which are almost entirely composed of references from the Upaniṣads). The very fact that he categorizes āgama as a vṛtti and thus comparable in one sense with other vṛttis such as viparyaya, error, the subject of the next sūtra, points to correspondences with aspects of post-Enlightenment thought, namely, that verifiable in this case yogic) experience trumps scripture. This has been termed a “radical mystico-yogic orientation,” since, certainly, as with the Enlightenment, such claims would have challenged the mainstream Vedic authority of the day. As for anumāna, while Patañjali uses this source of knowledge on occasion, such as in his arguments against certain Buddhist views, (IV.14–24), clearly almost his entire thrust throughout the sūtras is on pratyakṣa as the ultimate form of knowledge. Anumāna and āgama are forms of knowledge, but mediate forms, the truths of which are indirect, where the Yoga tradition bases its claims to authoritativeness on direct, personal experience.

It is because of this orientation that yoga is, in my view, destined to remain a perennial source of interest to the empirical dispositions of the modern world. One must also note that there are different types of pratyakṣa: the commentary on the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, the Yukti-dīpikā, speaks of yogic perception as well as sensual perception (38.2). Indeed, several schools make a distinction between apara–pratyakṣa, conventional perception, and para-pratyakṣa, supernormal perception, or, as the Sāṅkhya Sūtras put it, external perception, bāhya-pratyakṣa, and internal perception abāhya-pratyakṣa (I.90).73 As will become clearer later in the text, the perception of interest to Yoga is the latter, that of a supernormal nature. But even the startling claims of omniscience that occur later in the text are relevant only as signposts of experiences that the yogī will encounter on the path of Yoga, not as articles of faith.

Perception, Inference And Testimony Constitute the Pramanas.

Right perception arises from direct observation, inference, or the words of others.

The sources of correct understanding are direct perception, inference, and revelation derived from reflections on the scriptures, or from the testimony of one who knows.

(Facts of) right knowledge (are based on) direct cognition, inference or testimony.

Taimini Commentary:

Pramana which may be translated approximately as right knowledge or knowledge related to facts, comprises all those experiences in which the mind is in direct or indirect contact with the object of the senses at the time and the mental perception corresponds with the objects. Although three sources of right knowledge are mentioned in the Sutra and only in one (Pratyaksa) there is direct contact with the object, this does not mean that there is no contact with the object in the other two. The contact in these two cases is indirect, through some other object or person. A simple illustration will make this point clear. Suppose you see your car coming to your door. You recognize it at once. This knowledge is, of course, Pratyaksa. Now, if you are sitting in your room and hear the familiar sound of your car in front of your house you recognize it at once as your car. Here your knowledge is based on contact with the object but the contact is indirect and involves the element of inference. Now suppose again you neither see nor hear the car but your servant comes and says that your car is at the door. Here again the contact with the object is indirect but your knowledge is based on testimony. In all these three cases since the image which springs up in your brain corresponds with a fact, the Citta-Vrtti comes under the category of Pramana or right knowledge. If it does not, for example, if your inference with regard to the presence of your car is wrong or the servant makes an incorrect report, then your knowledge is wrong and belongs to the second category i.e. Viparyaya. Knowledge of the Pramana type may be based partly on one and partly on another of these three sources but if it corresponds with facts, it belongs to this type.

Correct knowledge is direct, inferred or proven as factual.

Iyengar Commentary:

Correct knowledge is based on three kinds of proof: direct perception, correct inference or deduction, and testimony from authoritative sacred scriptures or experienced persons. Initially, individual perception should be checked by reasoned logic, and then seen to correspond to traditional or scriptural wisdom. This process involves the enlightened intelligence, or buddhi.

In modern intellectual terms, we take buddhi to be a monolithic entity. This is unhelpful when trying to understand its true role in our lives and in our yogic practice. Let us first separate it from mind, in which brain, whose function is to receive sensory information, to think and to act, has its source. Thinking expresses itself in the form of electro-magnetic waves.

Intellect is more subtle than mind. It is concerned with the knowledge of facts and the reasoning faculty, and becomes discernible only through its inherent quality, intelligence, which is closer to consciousness than to the mind/thought process. Intelligence is inherent in every aspect of our being, from the physical to the blissful. It is non-manifest only in the atman/purusa, the core of being.

The quality of intelligence is inherent but dormant, so our first step must be to awaken it. The practice of Asana brings intelligence to the surface of the cellular body through stretching and to the physiological body by maintaining the pose. Once awakened, intelligence can reveal its dynamic aspect, its ability to discriminate. Then we strive for equal extensions to achieve a balanced, stable pose, measuring upper arm stretch against lower, right leg against left, inner against outer, etc. This precise, thorough process of measuring and discriminating is the apprenticeship, or culturing, of intelligence; it is pursued in the internal sheaths by pranayama, pratyahara and the further stages of yoga.

We can thus see that discrimination is a weighing process, belonging to the world of duality. When what is wrong is discarded, what is left must be correct.

When discrimination has been cultivated and intelligence is full and bright, ego and mind retreat, and citta becomes sharp and clear. But spiritual intelligence, which is true wisdom, dawns only when discrimination ends. Wisdom does not function in duality. It perceives only oneness. It does not discard the wrong, it sees only the right. (Patañjali calls this exalted intelligence, or vivekaja jñanam, III.55.) Wisdom is not mingled with nature, and is indeed unsuitable for the problems of life in a dualistic world. It would be of no use to a politician, for example, however high his motives, for he must choose and decide in the relative and temporal world. Spiritual wisdom does not decide, it knows. It is beyond time.

However, the progressive refinement of intelligence is essential in the search for freedom. The discriminating intellect should be used to ‘defuse’ the negative impact of memory, which links us in psychological time to the world of sensory pleasure and pain.

All matter, from rocks to human cells, contains its own inherent intelligence, but only man has the capacity to awaken, culture and finally transcend intelligence. Just as the totally pure citta, free from sensory entanglements, gravitates towards the atman, so, once intelligence has achieved the highest knowledge of nature, it is drawn inwards towards the soul (IV.26). Buddhi has the capacity to perceive itself: its innate virtue is honesty (I.49).

The sources of right knowledge are direct perception, inference and scriptural testimony.

Satchidananda Commentary:

One example of what Patañjali calls valid knowledge is what you understand by seeing something yourself—direct perception. If you see something face-to-face, you don’t have any doubt. That is one way to get valid knowledge. Another is by inference. Seeing smoke, you infer there is fire, because without fire there can’t be smoke. When you see a cow giving milk, you infer that cows give milk. You have not seen them all, but you assume.

And there is one more way. You may not have seen anything personally and may not have anything from which to infer, but a reliable authority, or person who has really understood something, tells you.

Here we normally mean the holy scriptures, which we believe because they are the words of the sages, saints and prophets. They have seen the truth and have expounded upon it, so we believe them. That’s why in the East, if anybody asks you to do some practice, it is expected that the scriptures also recommend it. You should not do something just because I say so. Everybody who has gone the same road should approve it, and the ancient scriptures should also approve it because the truth is the same. It is not something to be newly invented. All our present-day inventions can easily go wrong. What is the best thing today will be the worst thing tomorrow. They are still not finalized. The words of the prophets given through the holy scriptures are finalized. They can’t just be modified.

But even in this, we have to understand the difference between the basic truth and the presentation. Truth can be presented only through some form or vehicle. We should always remember that the truth of the Self is the same, but when presented to you through words and forms and modes, it may appear in different ways to suit the individual or the trend of the age. That means rituals can be modified, language can be modified. But the truth can never be changed because truth is always the same. The rites are just the skeletal structures that uphold the outside building, but the foundation of all the rites should be the same. That is why, whatever be the scripture, whether from the East, West, South or North, the basic truth should be in agreement.

It’s something like remaining the same while changing your clothing to suit the occasion. When you go skiing, you don’t wear your business suit. When you go to the office, you don’t come with ski boots on. Both these outfits are useless at a fancy wedding, and all three are ruled out if you go to the beach. But the person wearing the clothes remains the same. In the same way, the truth in all the scriptures is the same. But the presentation will vary.

If a teacher says, “Concentrate and meditate, ” or “Analyze your mind and develop virtuous qualities in your life, ” all the scriptures of the world should also say that. If I say, “In the name of Yoga, you can tell ten lies every day. That is the modern Yoga. Believe me, ” you can always ask, “Where is the proof?” I should be able to give a scriptural authority. If I cannot, there is something wrong with me. That’s why you need not just believe and follow someone or something blindly. If you have any doubt, refer to any holy book. “Has the Holy Scripture approved it?” If you find it there also, then follow it.

So, by all these three ways we get valid knowledge. Of course, whether it is valid or invalid, ultimately you have to set it aside to find your peace. But before we push out all thoughts, we try to analyze them and eliminate one set after another. We can’t just throw everything into one garbage pail. When I tried to do that once, the ashramites asked me not to. They said, “Gurudev, you have to put the vegetables in one, the papers in another and the bottles in still another one.”

“Why?”

“The papers can be recycled but the vegetables go into the compost pile for the garden.” So, even in throwing out garbage, you can’t just throw it into one pail. You have to sort it so that later on it will be easier to dispose of.

It is the same way with the mind. You are going to dispose of all the thoughts as garbage, no doubt, whether they are good or bad, right or wrong, so that the mind will be free from modifications. But before we come to that, it makes it easier to dispose of them if we sort them first. Why? Because we still have a little clinging. We can’t just throw everything away so easily. For example, when your wardrobe is too full you may say, “I’ll give these dresses to somebody.” But by the time you take it to the door, your mind will say, “I think I should keep just this one.” See? First it’s, “I’ll throw out everything; I don’t want these things.” Then, when your friend comes to take them, you say, “Wait, wait, just leave this one for me. I can use it for another year. Let it be.”

So we have to make use of this attitude. Your mental wardrobe is also full. You want to throw something out, but you don’t feel like just dumping out everything. So you analyze, “This is painful. It’s not necessary. But these things seem to be nice. Let them be.” For the satisfaction of the mind, we are trying to analyze how many kinds of thoughts there are. “Oh, you are not going to empty me completely. At least you are giving something back to me.” The mind has to be tricked like that.

I still remember when I was a young boy, my mother used to feed me, and I would make a fuss: “No. I don’t want it all.”

“Oh, is this too much, son? All right, I won’t give you all of it.” She would form all the rice into a flat disk and then cut a line across and say, “See, I’m taking away half; you only have to eat the other half.” So, the other half would be pushed aside on the plate, and she would feed me, and I would be satisfied. But while I was eating, she would start telling me nice stories, and before long the other half would also have vanished.

If by any chance I looked down at the plate before the whole thing was empty and said, “Mother, you are feeding me more, I don’t want it, ” she would say, “All right, son, I’ll take away this half.” She said she would take away half, no? She always took half from the remaining portion. That is a trick in feeding a child.

The same trick can be used in emptying the mind of thoughts. Tell the mind, “All right, you have that much, and I’ll take the rest away.” After a while say, “This also seems to be unwanted; let’s take this away also.” You remove them little by little. That’s why Patañjali is so careful in forming the thoughts into different groups. 

Direct perception, inference, and competent evidence, are proofs.

SV Commentary:

When two of our perceptions do not contradict each other we call it proof. I hear something, and, if it contradicts something already perceived, I begin to fight it out, and do not believe it. There are also three kinds of proof. Direct perception, Pratyaksham, whatever we see and feel, is proof, if there has been nothing to delude the senses. I see the world; that is sufficient proof that it exists. Secondly, Anumana, inference; you see a sign, and from the sign you come to the thing signified. Thirdly, Aptavakyam, the direct perception of the Yogi, of those who have seen the truth. We are all of us struggling towards knowledge, but you and I have to struggle hard, and come to knowledge through a long tedious process of reasoning, but the Yogi, the pure one, has gone beyond all this. Before his mind, the past, the present, and the future, are alike one book for him to read; he does not require to go through all this tedious process, and his words are proofs, because he sees knowledge in himself; he is the Omniscient One. These, for instance, are the authors of the Sacred Scriptures; therefore the Scriptures are proof, and, if any such persons are living now, their words will be proof. Other philosophers go into long discussions about this Apta, and they say, what is the proof that this is truth? The proof is because they see it; because whatever I see is proof, and whatever you see is proof, if it does not contradict any past knowledge. There is knowledge beyond the senses, and whenever it does not contradict reason and past human experience, that knowledge is proof. Any madman may come into this room and say that he sees angels around him, that would not be proof. In the first place it must be true knowledge, and, secondly, it must not contradict knowledge of the past, and thirdly, it must depend upon the character of the man. I hear it said that the character of the man is not of so much importance as what he may say; we must first hear what he says. This may be true in other things; a man may be wicked, and yet make an astronomical discovery, but in religion it is different, because no impure man will ever have the power to reach the truths of religion. Therefore, we have first of all to see that the man who declares himself to be an Apta is a perfectly unselfish and holy person; secondly that he has reached beyond the senses, and thirdly that what he says does not contradict the past knowledge of humanity. Any new  discovery of truth does not contradict the past truth, but fits into it. And, fourthly, that truth must have a possibility of verification. If a man says “I have seen a vision,” and tells me that I have no right to see it, I believe him not. Everyone must have the power to see it for himself. No one who sells his knowledge is an Apta. All these conditions must be fulfilled; you must first see that the man is pure, and that he has no selfish motive; that he has no thirst for gain or fame. Secondly, he must show that he is super-conscious. Thirdly, he must have given us something that we cannot get from our senses, and which is for benefit of the world. And we must see that it does not contradict other truths; if it contradicts other scientific truths reject it at once. Fourthly, the man should never be singular; he should only represent what all men can attain. The three sorts of proof, are, then, direct sense perception, inference, and the words of an Apta. I cannot translate this word into English. It is not the word inspired, because that comes from outside, while this comes from himself. The literal meaning is “attained.”

These painful and non-painful modifications are of five descriptions : — Real Cognition, Unreal Cognition, Imagination, Sleep and Memory. The Real Cognitions are Perception or sense-cognition ; Inference or Sequential Cognition and Verbal Cognition.

Perception is the mental modification which cognizes chiefly the specific appearance of an object, being of the nature of both the generic and the specific qualities, and which has it for its object, by means of the impression caused therein by the external object through the passage of the senses. The result is the knowledge of the modifications of the mind by the Purusa, as if they were not all distinguishable from himself. We shall establish further on that the Purusa knows by reflex conjunction with the will-to-be.

Inference or Sequential Cognition is the mental modification which cognizes the generic nature chiefly and has for its sphere the relation which exists in objects of the same class with that which is inferred, but does not exist as such in objects of different classes. For example, the moon and the stars are moving objects, because they go from one place to another like Chaitra. And the VindhyA mountain does not move, because it is not seen going from one place to another.

An object perceived or inferred by a competent man is described by him in words with the intention of transferring his knowledge to another. The mental modification which has for its sphere the meaning of words is the Verbal Cognition to the hearer. When the speaker has neither perceived nor inferred the object, and speaks of things which cannot

~ Rāma Prasāda translation.

Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa
or the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa
by Śaṅkara

Patañjali Sūtra I.7

Right knowledge is either direct perception, inference, or authority

The right knowledge called direct perception is the process when the mind is coloured by an external thing through a sense-channel, and takes as its field the determination mainly of the particular nature of the thing, which has however also the nature of a universal.

What then are the five kinds of mental process, tainted or pure? They are right knowledge, illusion, logical construction, sleep, memory. All the mental processes are included in these.

Right knowledge is either direct perception, inference, or authority. The process called right knowledge (pramāṇa, also proof) is divided into just these three, the first division of right knowledge being direct perception. Now the definition of direct perception is given. It is put first because the other two presuppose it.

By a sense channel: the sense referred to is one of the five senses of perception like hearing, not one of the senses of action (e.g. speech) which produce actions but not thoughts. The word could mean either but here he wishes to explain mental processes, so he is referring only to senses like hearing, which produce them. When mind is transformed by a thought, in verbal or some other form, the sense (by which the form is received) is the channel, the gateway. So the mind, through that gateway of sense, is transformed into the form of an external thing, which is both a universal and a particular, and is coloured by it. As a result of that colouring of the mind, the mental process receives an impression (prati-mudrā) as if from a seal (mudrā); the impression is of a thing which is both a universal and a particular, but it is determined mainly by the particular aspect, and this is called direct perception.

(Opponent) A sense like hearing, and the mind, can reflect both the universality (i.e. class) and the particularity of an object; why is this supposed to be concerned mainly with determining a particular?

(Answer) Because rejection and acceptance are concerned with particulars. It is not that the universal is not recognized, but it is taken as secondary. When it is said ‘blue colour’, the main thing is to specify blue, but it is the colour (universal) which is blue, this being a secondary meaning. So ‘the word pain’, ‘the word happiness’, and ‘the word dull’, and the mental process (of perception) are concerned mainly with a particular. Moreover, perception of universals includes cases of doubt and illusion. Perceiving a universal, one may doubt whether this is indeed the particular he is seeking. Illusion, again, arises from memory of a different instance of the universal he is now perceiving. But doubt and illusion cannot maintain themselves when one has come to know the particular rightly, and so it is said that direct perception is concerned mainly with determining a particular. Even where one wishes only to determine a universal, whether for instance this is a cow or a horse, inasmuch as one alternative is discarded and the other is settled on, the main thing is determination of which particular universal it is. Everything is both a universal and a particular in relation to other things.

(Opponent) But a universal is only something unreal (a-vastu), projected (adhyāropita) like mirage water on desert ground, and not an object of the senses.

(Answer) If so, there would be no regularity in the universals projected. Nothing can be projected unless perceived before. Someone who has never seen water does not project mirages in the desert.

(Opponent) He might project (adhyāropayet) something he did not remember.

(Answer) If so, one might project (adhyasyet) a quality of sound on to what had colour (i.e. anything could be projected on to anything).

(Opponent) Colour and sound are fields of different senses, so no such projection (adhyāsa) can take place.

(Answer) No; you have said they are unreal (a-vastu), so they can not be distinct particulars. Once you admit distinct particulars, they must be real. Again, unless we accept direct perception with its distinctions of place, time and other circumstances, practical life will collapse. There would be no memories ‘I saw this on that occasion and that at that time, and so I can make out what it is’. There can be no memory of subjects and their predicates unless they have been directly perceived. No one in fact lives by fantasy (kalpanāpodha) remote from the field of practical life. There it is proper to accept perception only as it is generally recognized.

(Opponent) The yogic vision from trans-conceptual (nirvikalpa) samādhi does not fit into the definition through a sense-channel. Furthermore, the knowledge of happiness, passion and so on has not previously passed through a sense-channel; so some other means of right knowledge must be supposed for them, unless they are to be called direct perception (and the definition amended).

(Answer) The difficulty is avoided by observing that direct perception is an idea (pratyaya) in Puruṣa, there being no mental process of direct perception which is not an idea. It is only as arising from an idea in consciousness (caitanya) that it has the power of perception at all. So it is now going to be said by the commentator, The result is an awareness by Puruṣa of the mental process not distinguished from it. This being so, in the case of the knowledge of happiness or passion etc., whether tainted or pure, it comes down to an idea in Puruṣa not distinguished from these things, so it is certain that they are cases of direct perception. When it is said that perception is through a sense-channel, this is (not a definition but) merely a corroboration (anuvāda) of what happens in ordinary perception in the world. Otherwise, the knowledge possessed by the yogin, and by the Lord, which does not depend on sense-organs, would not come under direct perception. But in fact, when the limitation of the taints has been removed, there is simultaneous perception of all things, however subtle or remote, by the mind-sattva, which goes to all objects and all fields. It will be said (sūtra III.54) Knowledge-born-of-discrimination, having all, and all times, without sequence, for its object, is called Transcendent (tāraka). So the definition of direct perception is not to be restricted to what comes through sense-channels. Coloured by an external thing is to rule out illusion. Doubt is ruled out by the fact that right knowledge is concerned mainly with ascertaining a particular. The result is an awareness by Puruṣa of the mental process, not distinguished from it.

(Opponent A) Some say that right knowledge (pramāṇa, also proof) is its own result.

(Opponent B) But others maintain that the result is not right knowledge, but something else, namely a development of right knowledge. As for instance the result of the right knowledge which perceives a jar is an idea (buddhi) of putting it aside, or picking it up, or disregarding it altogether. Since these ideas of picking it up, or disregarding it altogether and so on, are concerned with good points of the jar, or its defects, or absence of either, they are quite distinct from the bare perception of the jar which is the right knowledge of it. Therefore the result of the right knowledge relating to an object is something different, namely a development of the right knowledge, and it relates to a different object.

(Answer to Opponent B) It is not reasonable to say that the result of chopping up a khadira tree is the picking up or throwing away of the khadira wood. For the picking up or throwing away are themselves results of connection or separation, and one cannot speak of the result of a result – that would be dividing the result into two, and there would be a gap. If results were to have results, it would mean that actions would not be needed, inasmuch as action is something done with a view to a result. If a previous result is going to bring about a result even without action, people will not engage in action needed to bring to fulfilment anything needing much effort. Nor would they search for means, because they would not be needing action.

(Answer to Opponent A) Nor can the result be the action (for instance perception or inference) itself. For (if it were) action would never come to an end. Action leads to the result, and if the result were no more than the action itself, results would not be desired, because action is inherently troublesome.

(Answer to both opponents) Therefore the result is not simply the right knowledge itself, nor is it some other kind of right knowledge different from it. So he says, The result is an awareness by Puruṣa of the mental process, not distinguished from it. Not distinguished from it, not distinguished from that mental process called right knowledge; it is similar to it, being of its form. Awareness by Puruṣa, this is Puruṣa’s awareness, for it is Puruṣa’s taking on the form of the process. A result is not merely the material as it is, independent of any action. On the contrary, the result is the taking on by that material of a definite other state; it is produced by an action and appears with the cessation of the action, arising as the action attains its end. For only with fulfilment in the result does action come to its end. The awareness by Puruṣa of the mental process, not distinguished from it, is the main result. But side-effects – the (changes in a) substance resulting from an action apart from the main action, or some (further) action resulting from the (changed) substance – may allowably also be figuratively called results, since they bring out clearly the main result, by mutual reinforcement.

(Opponents) What you call the result is all purely figurative like that, for you accept as the result something not distinguished from the mental process. Puruṣa is pure, and so its assumption of that form is unreal. When a piece of red lac is put against a crystal, the crystal does not really become red.

(Answer) True. But still the main result is that alone, for it is seen to be so, and we do not see any other main result. Result means all that is produced by actions and agent, and it all ends in this. So it is defined as the result.

(Opponent) If the principal result, namely taking the form of the mental process, is only something unreal (mithyā-bhūta), there would be no desire for it.

(Answer) True. And experience is a purely illusory conformity to the mental process (mithyā-bhūta-vṛtty-anugata). So it will be said (sūtra III.35): Experience is an idea which does not distinguish between sattva and Puruṣa, though they are absolutely separate. And the commentator will say (close to II.6), When there is awareness of the true nature of these two, how would there be experience? For this reason, right vision (saṃyagdarśana) is followed by complete cessation of the mental process. But those who believe results to be real will not come to investigate them through right vision; there will be no release for them, because the requisite detachment will be absent. And release is not a consummation of action, because that would mean it would be impermanent. We shall describe later (under II.17) how Puruṣa is the witness (pratisaṃvedin).

(Opponent) It is not established that there is any cognizer (boddhṛ) of buddhi, or (if there is) that it is Puruṣa.

(Answer) We shall describe later how Puruṣa is the witness of buddhi. Now those who suppose that direct perception is a conjunction (saṃnikarśa) of a sense with its object are wrong in their supposition, because any conjunction is the result of some action. Conjunction is a coming together (saṃyoga) and that is stated in their school to be produced by action. What produces a thing is proof (pramāṇa) of it; what is produced is the result of the producer (and not a proof).

(Opponent) Though it is a result, still as regards knowledge, the conjunction is proof.

(Answer) Not so. For when the topic is the (enlightening) proof which makes a thing known (jñāpaka pramāṇa), it is not proper to bring in a (creating) proof which produces a thing (kāraka pramāṇa). As your conjunction is, on your showing, the cause of producing knowledge (jñānasya utpādaka), it is not what makes that knowledge known. Direct perception and so on are brought forward to explain cognition of the knowable object (prameya), not as a cause for the rise of knowledge. The latter would introduce something irrelevant into the context.

(Opponent) But knowledge is itself something to be known (prameya), and when it arises, it is known; so the conjunction which makes it rise (utpattikāraṇa) is what makes it known (jñāpaka).

(Answer) No, for you yourself admit that knowledge is known only by knowledge, and a conjunction is not itself knowledge, for you have stated it to be what causes the rise of knowledge.

(Opponent) As providing the occasion for it, the conjunction is a cause of the knowledge of knowledge, so it is right knowledge (pramāṇa). (Answer) Then the opening of the eyes and so on, and the inscrutable will of the Lord (as destiny), could not be refused the status of right knowledge, because they too provide the occasion for knowledge. If knowledge is to be itself known, the only way to avoid an infinite regress is to accept consciousness as the very nature of self (ātman).

(Opponent) The knownness of knowledge is simply as being an attribute inherent in the self, so no other knowledge which would involve a regress is needed.

(Answer) You still need a further knowledge, a direct perception, of the inherence of the knowledge in the self, because that fact is not accessible to the senses. Moreover, since your conjunction is supposed to be what produces knowledge as its result, the production will take time, so that knowledge would not be immediate. If the knowledge is to be immediate, it can not be the result of a conjunction. And we have already pointed out that such ideas as rejecting are not results of simple knowledge of forms and so on. Also there is the uncertainty. As when there arises in a number of men the same knowledge of the body of a beautiful woman, in one of them there is the idea of possessing her, in another the idea that she should be avoided, and in yet another neither of these ideas. There is no certainty whether the idea of possessing or the idea of avoiding will arise, though in both cases the knowledge is the same; and in the one who is indifferent, neither of the ideas appears. What is uncertain in its relation to another, cannot be the result of it. Again, the indifference of the third man is simply a negative, inasmuch as it is no more than absence of avoiding and possessing, and the result of a positive right knowledge should not be a negative. The pair of ideas, taking and rejecting, are from the pair love and hate. Following the maxim ‘no effect without a cause’, without the latter pair there will be no idea of avoiding or taking; but there is still the consciousness of right knowledge, and that is what is called indifference. Since therefore there is this uncertainty about them, the ideas of avoiding and so on cannot be the result of right knowledge. Furthermore, the ideas of taking and so on being the results of love or hate or absence of either, it would follow that love and hate or indifference would themselves be right knowledge. (That would be a contradiction) but there is no contradiction when we take the result to be awareness by Puruṣa of the mental process.

(Opponent) It has not been shown how the mental process can itself be a knowable, for what is an instrument cannot be the object – the sickle is not cut by itself.

(Answer) The explanation is, that an action is of a different character from the instrumentalities which bring it to fulfilment. The instrumentalities, united for the completion of the action, operate reciprocally as object and subject for each other. But where a so-called action causes the result by its mere existence, its instrumentality is only figurative and not like that of a true agent. For to say that acting is the same as causing to act would be making the ‘action’ (by mere existence) into an instrumentality, and what is past is not to be described as future. Further it entails a regress. If action were an instrument, there ought to be another action by which it would be impelled. Without this other action, no instrumentality would be possible for it. This other action would also be the instrument of still another action, and that of another, and so on. Since the chain of actions would never cease, it would never accomplish its result. If it is said that a final one could cause the result without needing any further action, then why not the first one? But it is not objectionable that the mental process should be knowable, because of the very fact that it is a revealer. We see that revealers, such as light, are instruments just because of their inherent knowability, and so it is with the mental process too. (Opponent) The eye and other sense-organs also are revealers, but they are unreliable, because (sometimes) they do not perceive. (Answer) The reason is, that there is a mingling of two things of the same kind. The senses are physical, and since there is the light of the eye which appears simultaneously with the external light which is of a physically similar kind, there is confusion as to which it is that is being perceived. When the light of several lamps appears simultaneously, it cannot be made out which is the light of which. And so with the ears and other senses.

(Opponent) Then in the case of the inner sense, which is not physical, it is a revealer of the same kind as the mental process, since that too is a revealer. So the mental process will not be perceived.

(Answer) Not so. Thanks to the consciousness (caitanya) with which it is endowed, it is not separate or distanced (from consciousness). Self (ātman) is all-pervading, and being subtle and extremely pure, has perception of the mental process because the mind is not distanced from it. Therefore it is established that Puruṣa, taking on the form of that very mental process of right knowledge, is aware of it. It is that being known which is the result. Some maintain that a mental process is not directly knowable and there is no means to perceive any result (of right knowledge). For a result to be perceived, some unknown (means of) knowledge must be presumed. (They have to say that) no result is perceived, because they accept no proof that could operate to perceive it. And if one were accepted, there would be a regress. A right knowledge assumed to perceive the result (of right knowledge) will itself have a result, for which another right knowledge will be needed in proof, and there will be no end of the chain. On their view, since there is no right knowledge of it, it must follow that this result does not exist, because there is no proof. Where means of proof which would reveal some existence do not go into operation, we assume that the thing is not there.

(Opponent) There could still be a right knowledge of the result though not itself perceived.

(Answer) No, because that would go against its character of being a revealer. Though seen to be revealing, your revealer would not (itself) be perceived. But a torch, even on the peak of a mountain, never loses its innate character (of being visible).

(Opponent) The right knowledge, being simply a revealer, reveals its result also.

(Answer) That confirms what we are maintaining. For one has perceptions of love and hate as particular mental processes. ‘I love’ and ‘I hate’ are each a particular process of the I-idea (aham-pratyaya); the perception of the mental process of love and so on is by perceiving oneself as having or not having them. Otherwise there would indeed be necessary some other means of knowledge to know them, as if they were external forms. And then there would be a regress. So refusal to recognize that right knowledge has a result (i.e. being witnessed by Puruṣa) is arrogant obstinacy and should be disregarded as vain argument. Inference is the mental process which has as its field the relation of inclusion of what is to be inferred among things of a like class, and exclusion of it from those of a different class. It is mainly concerned with determining a universal. What is to be inferred, all about what one seeks to know; inclusion, as being like them in characteristics and nature, and exclusion, since it is not found there. Relation: what is this relation, and what two things does it relate? For a relation does not relate without two things to be related, as is clear from the sentence beginning with the relative pronoun which.

(Opponent) This inference is well known to be simply a relation between an indicatory mark and its possessor.

(Answer) No, for that would not suffice for drawing a conclusion (gamaka). A mere relation does not in itself lead to a conclusion. The relation with the mark has to be one of exclusion or inclusion. This is a question of the mark; it is no more than having or not having the mark, and that does lead to a conclusion.

(Opponent) But the mark alone is not thus conclusive without reference to a possessor of it. If a mark is to be taken as conclusive without reference to a relation between it and its possessor, then anything at all would be conclusive; so the relation should have been specified as relating these two.

(Answer) He has specified it, in the words which has as its field inclusion among things of a like class to what is to be inferred. Unless it were connected with what is to be inferred, namely the possessor of the mark, it would not be included among things of a like class, or excluded from things of an opposite class. So the clause beginning which confirms the generally accepted relation. A mental process having as its field the things related and their relation, specified positively and negatively (anvaya-vyatireka), mainly concerned with determining a universal, a universal possessing the indicatory mark. As having motion is inferred in the moon and stars, from their getting to another place, as with the man Caitra. The matter is clear merely from the definition. But to give instances and counter-instances demonstrates very plainly that there are actual examples of it. When it is said that the moon and stars have motion, it means that having motion is to be inferred in them. A corresponding (universal, namely) getting to another place, appears in things of like class which have motion, such as the man Caitra, and this excludes the stationary things of a different class, such as the Vindhya range. The relation is certain, because having motion is constant (in the examples of getting to another place). So a relation, invariably in the particular class, can inform one of another thing related, as in the case of cat and mouse (vadhya-ghātaka, hunter and prey) in causal relation. (Opponent) Allowing that between things which are not mutually exclusive there can be a permanent relation such as getting to another place, which leads to a conclusion, but there is no relation between cat and mouse, which are incompatibles, so how can you say there is anything to lead to a conclusion?

(Answer) The argument holds because there is a permanent relation between them (though invisible). Even in the case of the heavenly bodies, the feature of ‘getting there’ is not directly manifest to us (being too slow): if it were, the conclusion that they have motion would not be a case of inference (sāmānyato dṛṣṭa) at all. It is not in the moon and stars that the indicatory relation of getting there is directly perceived (though it is perceived in the case of the man).

(Opponent) If a relation can be conclusive even though not directly perceived, then everything would be conclusive as to everything, for there is nothing which is not related to everything else, since they are all in universal space.

(Answer) That is why the relation, in the field of inference, is only what suffices to cause the rise of the idea bringing the desired conclusion (gamya-gamaka). With the cat and mouse, from seeing one of them, one concludes the absence of the other, which is a pure inference. From seeing that a thing is not in its usual place, it is concluded that it is somewhere else, just as from the sight of the cat one infers absence of the mouse. There is the familiar example, ‘when Caitra, a living man, is seen not to be at home, he is out.’ (The discussion now becomes technical. The opponent wishes to show that besides the three mentioned in the sūtra there are other means of right knowledge. One of these is cognition of absence, and a classical example referred to several times is this: a man looking for a jar glances into a bare room and concludes, ‘the jar is not here’. The opponent calls this direct cognition of absence of the jar. Śaṅkara brings it under an inference from the sight of the bare floor, making it an idea and not a direct perception.)

(Opponent) Surely these are (the proofs postulated by some schools called) cognition of absence (a-bhāva) and presumption (arthāpatti), and not inference, for they do not depend on indicatory features like the horns of a cow for instance. (Answer) No, because they do have indicatory features, namely the ones stated. The relation between cat and mouse has the feature of mutual exclusion. Wherever the cat may be, the mouse is never there – this is the invariable connection. The presence of the cat invariably means absence of the mouse, so also presence of the mouse means absence of the cat; it is like the presence of smoke and the inferred presence of fire.

(Opponent) How does the idea of the absence of the mouse from its usual haunts come to be known from the mere sight of the cat there? The operation of the means of right knowledge of existent things is in regard to the cat alone, and not to the mouse.

(Answer) From the mere right knowledge operating in regard to the cat’s presence, the idea of the absence of the mouse arises, as from the mere right knowledge operating in regard to the presence of smoke there arises an idea of the presence of fire. Right knowledge operating as regards the specific characteristics of the cat gives rise to the idea of the absence of the specific characteristics of the mouse, just as the idea of the specific characteristics of fire arises from right knowledge operating in regard to the specific characteristics of smoke. But for the one who argues for absence as a right knowledge, that knowledge of absence which he claims could never be specific; following up the sight of one of the incompatibles (like the cat) does not give actual sight of the absence of the other one (the mouse). Whereas to follow up a particular indicatory mark is as it were sight of the particular possessor of the mark. There is nothing specific about absence of the operation of right knowledge capable of revealing existent things, through which an idea could be formed of anything specific.

(Opponent) There is a specific thing which one wishes to know (for instance, whether the jar is there or not, and one knows it) from absence of any right knowledge of it.

(Answer) No; a non-existent can have nothing to do with associations of memory or will. What is non-existent like a hare’s horn is never found producing an effect by association.

(Opponent) We find it now.

(Answer) No; the two things are on quite a different footing and it is not an example.

(Opponent) Well, there is a similarity.

(Answer) No, because in the case of the jar we see that it is real. Nor is it reasonable that absence, which does not function because it is not a thing, should exist as a means of right knowledge. For in the world, what has no function is never found bringing about an effect. Therefore the idea of the absence of a knowable object, arising from a right knowledge capable of revealing it, is a knowable object like the idea of a jar; and because it is a fact, it causes some action or cessation of action. A counterexample is a non-existent like a hare’s horn. A right knowledge of absence, supposed to be produced by absence, would not in fact come into existence at all, for we see from the examples given that a thing is like what is known to be its cause. By the fact of being present, the sight of the cat is the indicatory mark for the idea of the absence of the mouse, and like the idea of smoke which causes the idea of fire, it dispels any doubt. Or one could say that the idea of the absence of the mouse, arising from the indicatory mark of the cat there, has a quality of certainty, like the idea of fire (from the indicatory mark of smoke).

(Opponent) The assertion ‘the jar is not here’ is not an inference, because it is not arrived at from an inferential relation of indicatory mark and its possessor. For the idea of fire is a following-up of an indication like smoke, but when it is said ‘the jar is not here’, there is no following-up of any such indication, because the idea is already there without it.

(Answer) Our position is not wrong. It is an idea in the form ‘here’ that is the indicatory mark. Following up the indication does not have to be from a previous idea of it. The mental impression in the form ‘here’ is the indicatory mark for the idea of the absence of the jar, the affirmative impression being excluded. Just as with the idea of the cat, here too the relation is one of exclusion. Where the things that cause the impression are not mutually exclusive, there is the idea ‘it is’. It is because of this invariable relation that we say that what is called presumption (arthāpatti) is in fact merely inference. In the case where the absence of a living man, Devadatta, in the house, means his presence outside, there is an inference both ways: when he is in, then he is not out, and when he is seen outside, this is his not being in – that is the pattern. The cause of the perception of absence is thus explained as the fact that something which could impress the mind is not impressing it. The knowledge of powers like burning in fire, is mere inference. For in experience, we find in ourselves an unvarying relation of result and what causes it. It is seen in our own self: ‘I can effect this result’ or ‘I cannot’, which is a cognition of power specific to oneself as possessed by the self (ātman). The result is the exercise of the power of burning (or the latent powers in oneself), and this is certainly an inference.

(Opponent) Some give this instance of direct perception of something not there: Suppose that an object lit by some light is being viewed with the help of a mirror (placed behind it), though not of course as a unitary whole. Now what is seen (in the mirror) is not actually there, so that the same illuminating direct perception of what is there (the front of the object) also illumines what is not there. They give this case also: someone is told, ‘Fetch the robe which has no pattern on it.’ On going to the store-room he finds a robe with a pattern next to one with no pattern. Seeing the patterned one, he knows by direct perception the robe distinguished by not having a pattern, and brings it. In this case there is no other means of right cognition except absence (through which he could know the robe).

(Answer) Not so; that would be to deny that objects are known through the mind’s taking on their form. And it is generally accepted that whatever the mind takes the form of, that is known as it is by direct perception. In the case of a blue thing’s being yellow (to vision affected by jaundice), the idea of the relation of the characteristic and its possessor turns out to be illusory (mithyā). In the same way, when it is said that the jar is not here, the idea of a relation of non-existence of the jar to the location Here is an idea of an unreal relation; no relation either acquired or inherent is conceivable between the absence of the jar and the location Here. Whereas when it is said that Devadatta is here, there is a relation. Therefore the idea of absence, like the blue thing’s looking yellow, must be illusory as an idea, even though there is a notion of a relation of characteristic and its possessor. If (you still say that) there is a relation between the absence of the jar and the location Here, then with a thing which is not blue, you will have a relation of non-existence of blueness, referring to an idea of a relation of blueness between the two things. But a relation is something that actually exists, and it is a contradiction to have this ambiguity about it, for you admit that absence is not an actual thing.

(Opponent) It is said by the grammarian, ‘One hundred and one are the meanings of the genitive case’ (as in absence of the jar, for instance).

(Answer) But then relationships could not be only of the two kinds called inherence and conjunction (as your school holds).

(Opponent) Let us say that the hundred and one relations of the genitive (including absence of the jar) can be subsumed under these two.

(Answer) No, for in the case of absence, it cannot belong to either. Further, when it is said ‘Here in the sky there is no flower’, we get a relation of the sky which is invisible, and the absence of the sky-flower which is also invisible. It is all invisibility alone, and like the absence of flowers falling from the sky, so in the location Here on earth, the absence of the jar is invisible. It has to be said how it would be distinguished.

(Opponent) (The cause of the anomaly is) because space is not visible (whereas earth is).

(Answer) Not so. For if a flower does fall in space, we see that it exists. So the reason cannot be that space is not visible. Just as the invisibility of space cannot be a cause of the real existence of a falling flower, so it cannot be a cause of perception of the opposite of real existence.

(Opponent) The cause is simply the invisibility of space.

(Answer) Then the invisibility of anything concealed, though unrelated, would also have to be a cause.

(Opponent) The absence of sky-flowers is directly seen.

(Answer) That would mean that the connection of sense with its object would be unnecessary (for perception), and if so, it would follow that everyone would have extra-sensory perception and be omniscient.

(Opponent) Well, we admit that absence of sky-flowers is a case of inference (but not absence of the jar).

(Answer) As with the absence of the sky-flower, there is no distinguishing feature of ‘absence of a jar here’; so it is certain that it is a matter of inference. Even for the proponent of absence as a means of right knowledge, the absence, for instance, of fire in waters concealed or remote must be a matter of inference; so the absence of a jar here, being of the same class, is knowable only by inference. This is the reasonable conclusion. The Vindhya range has no movement because it does not get anywhere. Another case of it is, that the Vindhya range has no movement because it does not get anywhere. The assertion is, that the Vindhya has no motion; the reason is, because it does not get anywhere. Taken with the case of Caitra, inference is shown working both ways, like the one-eyed crow (traditionally able to look all round). The relation is positive in the case of the moon and the stars having motion, and negative in the case of the Vindhya’s not getting anywhere. It is thus demonstrated by both agreement in presence (anvaya) and agreement in absence (vyatireka), and the definition is complete. Again, these applications show that illusion is ruled out (from the definition), and demonstrate that the definition has no defect because it applies equally to a different mark and its possessor. When someone competent communicates by word something seen or inferred by him, with the intention of conveying to the other his own knowledge, the mental process whose object is the meaning obtained from the word, is authority for the hearer. Someone competent motivated by goodwill to the other free from any defect (doṣa), his object being to tell something seen or inferred by him, intending to convey to the other to that particular hearer his own knowledge his own experience; by word: this here means a sentence, from which the particular meaning emerges. It is from the sentence that it is conveyed. The mental process whose object is the meaning of the sentence is mainly concerned with determining a universal, as in the case of inference. Authority for the hearer: this sort of knowledge has been preceded by the original knowledge of the thing possessed by the speaker, for whom it is not authority, since he has in mind something seen or inferred by himself, so that his own knowledge has come through the senses or from some indication. Authority is not direct perception because it is not something within the field of the senses, and it is not inference because it does not depend on any such relation of indication and indicated as described above. For the knowledge arising from the meaning of the (scriptural) words ‘heaven’, ‘apūrva’ (the invisible power of the sacrifice which produced a later effect), and ‘divinity’ (of the sacrifice) does not come from some previously established relation of indication and indicated. But as always with right knowledge, the result is an awareness of the mental process by Puruṣa. When a speaker says questionable things, neither seen nor inferred by himself, this is fallacious authority. But if an original speaker has seen or inferred it, the authority is not suspect. When a speaker says questionable things: when from his utterance, the mental process called authority arises, the result brought about by the operative statement is as before. The reference is to what is merely lacking in proof (i.e. not seen or inferred by the speaker himself), but that is not meant to exclude what is actually untrue, the operation of the statement being the same in both cases. The authority of what is said by a speaker of something questionable is, however, to be distinguished. What is this something questionable which he speaks? It is something neither seen nor inferred by that speaker – for instance a Buddha or Arhat, since their teaching is other than what is well known to informed people (śiṣṭa). For a mind which is not infected with the taint of passion and so on will not describe otherwise what is well known (as true). This is fallacious authority being only a semblance (ābhāsa). Though he has not spoken in so many words of semblance in the cases of direct perception and inference, by now pointing out that authority can in some cases be only a semblance, he implies that semblance is to be recognised as possible also in the previous cases of direct perception and inference, when their presentations are contrary to fact. But if an original speaker has seen or inferred it: if it derives from the Lord as the first speaker, there is no reason to doubt, for his authority as a speaker of truth is unquestionable. (Now the discussion turns to analogy (upamāna) which in some schools is rated as an independent means of knowledge. Śaṅkara denies this, to follow the sūtra which does not mention it.) Analogy (upamāna, also comparison and resemblance) presupposes words, and therefore is not a separate means of right knowledge but comes under authority. It occurs when having heard from a forest man ‘a buffalo is like a cow’, one sees a buffalo in the forest. Analogy is simply the memory of the similarity learnt from the previously heard sentence, and nothing more. The fact of similarity must have been previously learned from the words of the forest man. Analogy is not simply learning the relation of name and named, though it too is grasped only from some sentence about it. One might see a buffalo in the forest and think ‘it is a cow’, because until he has come to know the word buffalo, he is not aware of the relation of name and named so as to think ‘this is a buffalo’. The very word buffalo must refer back to some sentence about it: (in the case of analogy now discussed, the sentence was) ‘a buffalo is like a cow.’ It is clear to him only when he has previously heard a sentence about it.

(Opponent) But he has had no previous idea of what a buffalo is.

(Answer) You seem to be suffering from an inability to grasp the thrust of the argument – cornered like some wretched dog. (This sentence has been heavily amended by the editors and is perhaps corrupt – Tr.) To insist that there must have been some previous experience would entail many different cases of resemblance, differing by closer or remoter association with various times and places and circumstances.

(Opponent) Let it be so.

(Answer) A previous idea of the thing is not the mass of associations formerly perceived; they are not the thing itself. For when the word ‘cow’ is spoken, one can always understand the meaning from the word itself without specifications of place and time and so on. The mere knowledge of the relation of name and named is not analogy, for analogy is something by which things are compared, being a knowledge of similarity. In comprehending the relation of name and named, no comparison of anything is being made; that comes afterwards. It is after hearing about the resemblance (from the sentence of the forest man) that he too makes the judgement, ‘this is a buffalo’. So this (suggestion that analogy is nothing but the relation of name and named) fails.

(Opponent) Analogy could be an independent means of right knowledge, not consequent on words; the townsman, on seeing a buffalo in the forest, has the idea ‘this is like a cow’.

(Answer) Not so, because there is no object which it is sought to know (prameya). It is when something is being sought that the appropriate means of right knowledge go into operation to reveal something existent. But there is in fact no one similarity covering the points of resemblance and difference of cow and buffalo.

(Opponent) There is the idea of resemblance, and this must have some basis.

(Answer) True, and it is here that a distinction has to be made: (a) is this like the notion (pratyaya) of a collection, such as a forest? or (b) is it like the idea (buddhi) of a thing like a jar? Suppose it is like the notion of a forest, where the individual trees making up the pattern of growth are the causes of the notion ‘forest’, which does not exist apart from them. Just so the members (of the patterns) ‘cow’ and ‘buffalo’, through memories of the separate herds that have been seen, are the cause of determining a similarity, which does not exist apart from them. Therefore we arrive at something unreal. Then let it be that there is here a factuality and demonstrability like the notion of a jar. It is now to be asked: what sort of fact this is. (There are these possibilities:) Is it a single similarity, conforming to cow and buffalo, but distinct from cow-ness and buffalo-ness? Or if they are distinct from each other If (there are two similarities) distinct from each other, located in cow and buffalo but apart from them, are these qualified or not qualified by each other? Is it that an individual has characteristics of the other class? Is it that a class has characteristics of an individual of the other side? Or is (the similarity) a class with characteristics of individuals of both sides? Again, still further relations between them ought to be postulated with either one being the qualified and the other one the qualifier. Of these cases, if there is a single similarity applying to both sides, then there is nothing to be compared, because it is just a single thing, as if one should say ‘a cow is like a cow’.

(Opponent) By the similarity, one of two individuals may be compared.

(Answer) Not so: that would be referring to itself, as in ‘like a cow because of cow-ness’.

(Opponent) One individual may be compared with another like it.

(Answer) Not that either, for cow-ness is not a basis for likening a young calf with half horns and a hornless cow.

(Opponent) By considering where their characteristics differ, the similarity can be made a basis for the idea of comparison.

(Answer) Then the similarity perishes. If a differing characteristic is to be the basis of the idea of comparison, you have proposed a destroyer of the similarity. Furthermore there would be alternatives, such as whether a characteristic under consideration is single, having similarity to both sides, or divided, and there is just the same impossibility as before.

(Opponent) Let us say that the similarity is divided.

(Answer) The very assumption of a division refutes it: a horse is not like a cow. If things are taken one by one, the innumerable considerations become unmanageable. The previously proposed relations between class and individual are refuted in the same way. Now take the hypothesis that similarity is an imaginary abstraction consisting of bringing out one idea by ignoring any opposing ideas. In that case, how is it that the notion of the spaces in the forest, in front of the trees and to their right and left, is not taken – by ignoring everything else – as a thing (as the trees are taken as a forest, in disregard of the spaces)?

(Opponent) Let it be that the idea of the forest is merely the trees which cause the idea of it.

(Answer) If so, ‘a cow is similar to a buffalo’ is merely an illusory notion (mithyā-pratyaya), as the idea of a forest is.

(Opponent) Well, if as you have said opposites cannot be compared, how is it that a horse is likened to a cow (as a domestic animal, for instance)?

(Answer) Both sides have parts, opposite or corresponding, in themselves which are causes of the idea of analogy, and it comes to the same thing as the notion of a forest. The point need not be laboured too much: these many parts observed on both sides are the cause of the idea of similarity, as the trees cause the idea of a forest, and so it is established that there is no independent means of right knowledge called analogy (but it is included under authority). (Reverting to the general point of authority as a means of right knowledge:) Nor should we imagine that since what is knowable is of just two kinds (perceptible or imperceptible), the means of right knowledge must be of just two kinds also (perception and inference, as Buddhists hold). Why not? Because an object is known as determined by the right knowledge, and it is not to be supposed that the object determines the right knowledge. If each object determined the knowledge of it, then everyone would be omniscient. In (the sacred declaration) ‘From worship in the temple comes heaven’, the idea of worship as the cause of attaining heaven is not in the field of perception or of inference, and it would be illusory unless one supposed a separate right knowledge for it.

(Opponent) This idea could be a corollary of an inference.

(Answer) If it is only a corollary, it would not itself be in the class of a right knowledge; in that case, the same would apply to the idea of what is referred to in the (sacred Buddhist) Three Refuges and so on. In any case, the purpose here is not to analyse right knowledge. The main thing is to point out the accepted means of right knowledge, and other mental processes, with a view to inhibit them. The author of the sūtra-s, therefore, did not make further sūtra-s on them, and the commentator merely added something to confirm what is generally accepted. What objection can there be to following him?